Shortly before the so-called Russian presidential elections, Putin gave an extensive interview to the general director of the “Russia Today” agency and the deputy general director of the VGTRK holding Dmitry Kiselyov, who asked in a friendly way, winking like an old man: “Well, tell me honestly, has the thought not crept into your head at some point – let’s explode with a tactical atomic bomb?”, to which Putin replied in feigned surprise: “For what? There is no such need.”
There is no doubt that this question, like the entire interview, was pre-arranged and carefully rehearsed. Putin did not even pretend to be confused about the absurd nature of the question, unacceptable in the modern civilized world. His reaction clearly expressed: this thought has not crept into my head at some point, but it has been sitting there for a long time. Quite deliberately and purposefully. You can say it goes without saying. That is, as soon as there is a need for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, this will be done. For now, we do without such a need.
This further declaration of readiness to use nuclear weapons is an integral part of Putin’s bluff strategy. Immediately after the announcement of the Russian Ministry of Defense, this component of the bluff was pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and this is exactly how the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabriels Landsbergis explained this statement in an interview with Steven Saker on the BBC program “HARDtalk”.
Let’s remember that on the second day after the invasion of Ukraine, on February 25, 2022, when the political leadership of Ukraine was not going to flee anywhere and its armed forces were not even thinking of surrendering, Putin sat the visibly embarrassed, blushing Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and the General Staff of the Armed Forces at the far end of a long table in the Kremlin chief Valery Gerasimov and ordered them to raise the level of combat readiness of strategic nuclear weapons.
At that time, the world media made fun of Putin’s rather clumsy wording to increase the readiness of already ready forces, but with retroactive date it must be admitted that this move by Putin achieved its goal. If at the beginning of hostilities, when it became clear that the Kremlin’s blitzkrieg plan had failed, the question of the protection of Ukrainian airspace (no-fly zone) was raised, then it soon disappeared from the agenda. Instead, came Putin’s reassuring assurances that no soldier of the NATO countries would set foot on Ukrainian soil and would not join the war against the aggressor.
More than two years have passed since then, and boasting about Russia’s nuclear weapons has become a Kremlin propaganda routine. It no longer receives the anxiously strained attention it had at first. Therefore, the accents are slightly changed.
This week’s announcement specifically emphasizes that it is about non-strategic nuclear weapons. In this way, the threat level is lowered to the level of tactical nuclear weapons, which supposedly do not affect people outside of Ukraine. The idea of this shift in emphasis is: lowering the level of threats increases the likelihood of their implementation. It won’t be that crazy, so there’s a better chance that Putin could decide on it.
Although everyone seems to understand that nuclear blackmail is Putin’s main weapon in the fight against the West and this endless rhetoric is the purest bluff, it must be admitted that brandishing a nuclear weapon works quite effectively. The fear of so-called escalation still has a paralyzing effect on the world, not to be ironic about this nuclear weapons spree. This fear has a completely rational basis: Putin has already proven that he sometimes acts not quite logically and rationally from the point of view of the West. Everything can be expected from him, including the use of nuclear weapons.
The fact that Putin in his interview with Kiselyov indicates that there is no need for the use of nuclear weapons, because [pagaidām] can do without it, directly echoes the story prevailing in the Western public space that the greatest danger of using nuclear weapons will be at the moment when the Russian army is having a hard time at the front and it will suffer a heavy defeat. Based on this narrative, which Putin himself is happy to maintain, the West’s strategy in regulating arms supplies is to maintain a dynamic balance. Prevent any side from gaining a strategic advantage and breaking the course of the war, as any major change on the front threatens the dreaded “escalation”.
But let’s get back to the teachings that were announced. What does it mean? Non-strategic, that is, tactical nuclear weapons are nuclear warheads of low power (1-10 kilotons of TNT equivalent), which aim to gain a tactical advantage in a certain area of the front. Respectively, they are nuclear weapons that are not aimed at any large objects of strategic importance, but can be used for operational combat tasks. Their main goal is not large cities or any other large objects, but specific combat tasks. For example, ensuring a front break.
To understand what “low power” nuclear warheads mean, let’s remind that currently Russian hovering aerial bombs (KAB) with a 1.5 ton warhead are causing big problems for Ukrainians. A thousand such bombs detonated together would have the devastation effect equivalent to one 1.5 kiloton tactical nuclear warhead. In practice, this means scorched earth about a kilometer in diameter.
The operational tactical missile “Iskander” division and the squadron of Su-25 aircraft will take part in the planned exercises (the specific date has not yet been named). They will test the ability of these carriers to deliver tactical nuclear warheads to the target. The charges themselves will not be used or tested. Only their copies according to weight and other parameters. No further details have been reported, and it is believed that the main purpose of these exercises is to create propaganda pressure.
As already said, on the one hand, the smaller amount of potential damage reduces the sense of fear in the Western political class (which is what all Putin’s nuclear blackmail is aimed at), but on the other hand, it increases the likelihood that Putin could go for it. But this game of brandishing a nuclear warhead is a double-edged sword. Threats work best before they are put into action, because once the threat is implemented, completely different defense mechanisms come into play.
No one can predict the world’s reaction if Putin actually decided to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. If now the “global South” looks at the Russia-Ukraine war, in general, quite reservedly and takes a relatively neutral position or even rather takes the side of Putin, then in a situation when a nuclear power uses nuclear weapons against a country that does not have nuclear weapons, the sympathies of the third world can change significantly .
All the more so if Ukraine’s sad story about the Budapest memorandum, under which Ukraine gave Russia its nuclear weapons in exchange for the security guarantees of the great powers, will be heard. We can already see how much these “guarantees” are worth, but if Ukraine is subjected to nuclear bombardment, then this Budapest memorandum will already take on a very bad tone.
It is also impossible to predict what the reaction of Western public opinion will be. On the one hand, the Kremlin can hope that the Western public, accustomed to prosperity and a comfortable life, could be even more afraid of the “suspended” Putin, but just as well, the eyes of many could be opened and they would finally understand what they are dealing with. I would understand that no negotiations, no agreements are possible with the Kremlin maniac, and stories that “we do not want to change the regime in Moscow” are not only irrelevant, but also childishly naive.
At the moment, Putin’s comparisons with Hitler evoke understanding only in countries directly bordering Russia. Further west, such comparisons seem grossly exaggerated, even obscene. If Putin really decided to go nuclear, it could change a lot.
True, the world’s attitude would largely depend on the reaction of Western politicians. If they started another “deep concern” and “he will pay dearly for it” song again, the scales would not tip in the West’s favor. The world loves the strong, the brave and the winners. If the West shows itself to be weak, cowardly and ready to lose, then those who otherwise would not do so will turn away from them.
In order for the West not to have to prove this ability, it would be better if they preemptively and publicly told Putin what they were going to do, that he would start “doing stupid things”. Clear and unambiguous. So that you can’t go back on your words later. This is the only way to avoid having to make difficult decisions “post factum”.
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